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Robert Su er, 
Professor of Prac ce 
of Interna onal Affairs 
at George Washington 
University, explains 
that “The Na onal 
Defense Authoriza on 
Act of 2020, while it 
had sca ered 
provisions dealing 
with China, had li le 
of the priority and 
substance given to 
China in the previous 
year.”  
The so‐called “truce” in the trade war with the signing of the phase one U.S.‐China trade agreement on 
January 15 comes amid indicators that the intense U.S. government consensus pushback against a wide 
range of perceived challenges posed by China may be subsiding.  
The American government’s hardening policies toward China emerged somewhat erra cally following 
publica on of the surprisingly tough Trump administra on na onal security and na onal defense strategies 
at the turn of 2017‐2018. Both strategies iden fied China as America’s top interna onal danger. At first, the 
President and some of his senior officials were ambivalent about implemen ng the tough declaratory 
strategies against China, especially over economic issues. But the 115th Congress took the lead in 
advoca ng an across‐the‐board hard line, ul mately passing in August with broad bi‐par san support the 
major interna onal rela ons legisla on of 2018, the Na onal Defense Authoriza on Act of 2019. That law 
laid out the new “whole of U.S. government” effort against China, giving special a en on to restric ng 
investments and exports as part of newly prominent concerns over China’s high technology compe on and 
to defend against Chinese influence opera ons. There also was prominence devoted to ongoing issues such 
as Taiwan and the South China Sea.  
President Trump’s concurrent puni ve tariffs targeted Chinese economic prac ces seen as an “existen al 
threat” to the U.S. economy by the U.S. Special Trade Representa ve. Vice President Pence took the lead in 
explaining the hard government line in a speech in October in Washington and remarks in Asian mul lateral 
mee ngs in Asia in November 2018. And the Jus ce Department and the FBI in November announced their 
strong efforts against Chinese espionage and influence efforts. 
Significant follow through but less urgency in 2019 
2019 featured follow through by the administra on in countering Chinese challenges, though the publicity 
to such efforts subsided presumably at least in part because of off‐and‐on trade nego a ons with China. 
Secretary of State Pompeo made repeated speeches and other efforts to persuade allies and U.S. high 
technology companies of the wisdom of avoiding interac on with the controversial Chinese high technology 
company Huawei on grounds of na onal security. Na onal Security Adviser O’Brien, like Vice President 
Pence in 2018, strongly cri cized Chinese policies and prac ces during the annual summit mee ngs in Asia 
in 2019. Vice President Pence made another major speech in October 2019 reitera ng the hard U.S. 
government approach. A variety of administra on efforts went forward to support Taiwan and implement a 
strong Indo‐Pacific strategy to counter China. The Congress remained generally suppor ve, and was notably 
ac ve in reac on to China’s egregious viola ons of human rights involving the interment of one million 
Muslims and in support of the millions demonstra ng in Hong Kong against Beijing’s control. 
Nevertheless, the Na onal Defense Authoriza on Act of 2020, while it had sca ered provisions dealing with 
China, had li le of the priority and substance given to China in the previous year. China issues were 
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addressed in many other proposed bills, but the vast majority of such legisla on garnered li le 
congressional support. On the campaign trail, the leading Democra c candidates and the 
American media covering the campaign registered li le urgency over the China danger. Beijing’s 
human rights abuses in Xinjiang and control in Hong Kong were uniformly and frequently 
cri cized, usually without calls for strong U.S. countermeasures to punish China. China as a 
foreign policy issue, when treated at all, received low priority treatment in the Democra c 
candidates’ debates.  Media interviews with the candidates saw issues with China, if they came 
up at all, addressed toward the end of the discussion, not in the beginning.  
Of the leading candidates in early 2020, Vice President Biden backed away from his remarks 
earlier in the campaign about the insignificance of China’s challenge, but he repeatedly 
emphasized Chinese weaknesses in comparison to U.S. strengths, asser ng that China was in a 
much worse posi on than and no match for America. Newcomer candidate Michael Bloomberg 
kept a low profile on China against the background of his deep business rela ons and strong 
advocacy for American free trade and economic engagement with China. Prior to his announced 
candidacy, when ques oned about China’s crack down on dissent in a PBS interview in 
September, Mr. Bloomberg argued in defense of Xi Jinping that the Chinese president was 
represen ng his cons tuency and was not a dictator.  
There was li le hos lity toward China in Bernie Sanders’ rhetoric that, like Elizabeth Warren’s, 
blamed big business for the trade agreements that China exploited to the disadvantage of U.S. 
workers and average Americans. When asked directly, Sanders said China was not an existen al 
threat to America and he urged stronger U.S. efforts to establish a posi ve coopera ve 
rela onship with Beijing on climate change and other issues. Pete Bu gieg saw a real danger in 
China as a domina ng high tech power spreading its influence in the world through the Belt and 
Road Ini a ve and other efforts, yet his remedy was not to confront China through puni ve tariffs 
and restric ons. He saw the main answer as strengthening American compe ve assets at home, 
and he also averred that coopera on with China was needed on climate change and other issues. 
Meanwhile, Senator Amy Klobuchar saw u lity in well managed US‐allied pressures to get China 
to stop its trade and economic prac ces harming America, but she seemed to graphically 
illustrate the campaign’s limited interest in China when among the 100 steps she proposed to 
take in the first 100 days of her presidency only one, against Chinese steel dumping, was about 
China and it came far down the list.  
Short‐term Outlook 
Despite the difficulty in forecas ng American poli cs during an impeachment trial of an avowedly 
unpredictable president in an elec on year, China’s behavior will remain a key determinant of the 
level of U.S. a en on China issues receive going forward. Beijing appears for now to favor a low 
posture, avoiding confronta on, sugges ng that the recent trend of diminished U.S. a en on to 
China issues will con nue in the months The U.S. suspension of the GSP can be considered a 
blessing in disguise.  
"China’s behavior will 
remain a key 
determinant of the level 
of U.S. a en on China 
issues receive going 
forward. ”  
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